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IV.IMPLICATIONS ..................................................................................... 750

The Democratic victories in the 2020 elections have raised the prospect of
a unified Congress and executive branch committed to a robust civil rights
agenda. In addition to policing, voting rights, and racial justice legislation more
generally, one should add women’s rights to the likely legislative list: thenSenator Biden led the effort to enact the Violence Against Women Act, part
of which was struck down in 2000,1 and one can expect his Administration to
prioritize strengthening women’s rights initiatives, especially in light of the
#MeToo movement. Finally, the continued push for LGBT rights will likely
place sexual orientation and transgender identity on that agenda as well.2 As
this article is being edited in the summer of 2021, this work is already
underway.
As Congress and the President get down to this business, however, they
will confront both a skeptical Supreme Court and hostile Supreme Court
precedent. As to the first, the current Court has made clear its skepticism
about aggressive civil rights legislation.3 While Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh,
and Barrett joined the Court only recently, there is little reason to believe that
they will depart from that general skepticism. More broadly, there is no reason
to think that these new justices, and the Court they will shape, will shrink from
protecting both their own law-declaring authority and what they believe to be
states’ sovereign prerogatives against any perceived threat from federal civil
rights legislation.
Beyond the Court’s composition lies its doctrine. Nearly a quarter-century
has passed since City of Boerne v. Flores4 announced a stricter test for
evaluating federal legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Even
though later applications of Boerne’s “congruence and proportionality”
standard split heavily along ideological lines,6 Boerne itself enjoyed broad
1
2
3

4
5
6

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
See infra note 122 (citing source explaining the impetus behind current LGBT rights legislation).
See, e.g. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down a critical component of the
1965 Voting Rights Act because of skepticism about Congress’s factual record and solicitude for
states’ “equal sovereignty”); but see Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (interpreting
the prohibition on sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as encompassing
discrimination based on sexual orientation and transgender status).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (authorizing Congress “to enforce” the rest of the amendment
“by appropriate legislation”).
See Coleman v. Ct. of App. of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Bd. of
Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000);
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ideological support on the Court.7 Even more significantly, Boerne and its
subsequent stringent applications appear to have become stable precedent; in
2020, Justice Kagan wrote an opinion for seven justices reaffirming the
congruence and proportionality standard, and in particular, one of the closelydivided cases applying that standard, to strike down a copyright law’s
application to states.8 The remaining two justices, who had dissented in that
earlier case that Justice Kagan applied, recognized that they had lost the battle
and concurred in the result.9
The emerging picture thus combines political branches primed to enact
significant civil rights legislation with a skeptical Court wielding nowlongstanding precedent limiting the enforcement power.10 This prospect raises
important questions about the relationship between the Court and the political
branches in the project of safeguarding individual rights. This would not be
the first time the political branches have collided with either a Supreme Court
majority and/or a body of judicial precedent on individual rights issues. The
most famous example of such a collision was the Lochner-era Court’s battle
against the New Deal, a tale told many times.11 To be sure, that battle featured
a Court that saw itself as protecting individual rights against assertions of state

7

8

9

10

11

Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (all 5–4
decisions, with all of them falling along the familiar liberal-conservative axis except for Lane, which
fell along that axis except for Justice O’Connor’s agreement with the Court’s liberals); but see Nev.
Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (6–3 vote).
Six justices, spanning the ideological spectrum from Justices Thomas to Ginsburg, joined the majority
opinion in Boerne. Justice O’Connor would have joined it except for her disagreement with the
Court’s application of its underlying Free Exercise Clause doctrine, see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 544–45
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer appeared to agree with at least some of Justice O’Connor’s
endorsement of the majority’s enforcement power analysis, see id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter did not join the opinion, again because of disagreement with the underlying free
exercise doctrine the majority took as a starting point. However, he expressed no opinion about the
majority’s enforcement power analysis. See id. at 564 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (applying Florida Prepaid, supra. note 6, which struck down
a federal law regulating state trademark infringements as exceeding the enforcement power, to an
analogous federal copyright law).
See id. at 1008–09 (Breyer, J., concurring) (disagreeing with Florida Prepaid, but conceding that his
view “has not carried the day.” Id. Notably, of the then-four justice liberal bloc, the two who were
not on the Court in Florida Prepaid (Kagan and Sotomayor) respectively wrote and joined the
majority opinion. This suggests that, indeed, the view expressed by the Florida Prepaid dissenters
“has not carried the day.” Id.
Certainly, federal civil rights legislation can take the form of legislation the constitutionality of which
is uncontroversial. For example, in the wake of police violence against communities of color, calls
have arisen for strengthening constitutional tort remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Lynda
G. Dodd, What’s missing in the police reform debate (Part 2), BALKINIZATION (October 20, 2015),
available at https://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/10/whats-missing-in-police-reform-debate_20.html.
See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
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and federal regulatory prerogatives.12 But other episodes have featured
congressional contemplation of legislative action aimed at protecting
individual rights in the face of anticipated conflict with either the Court or its
precedent.
This Article examines four of those episodes to determine what they teach
us today, as the nation stands at the threshold of a similar conflict. Part I
begins by briefly laying out the doctrinal context—especially, but not only, the
Court’s doctrine governing Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.13 It then introduces three general approaches Congress might
take when seeking to ground civil rights legislation on a firm constitutional
foundation despite the existence of a skeptical Court or hostile precedent:
challenging unfavorable precedent, avoiding it by relying on a different
constitutional power, or arguing that its legislation merely applies that
precedent.14
Part II considers four instances of congressional deliberation—over what
became the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s public accommodations provisions,15 the
private right of action provided by the 1994 Violence Against Women Act,16
and the 2003 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act,17 as well as thus-far unenacted
legislation prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation
(and, in later iterations, gender identity)18—to uncover what those debates offer
by way of lessons for congressional action over the next several years. Each of
these examples confronted a slightly different judicial and doctrinal backdrop
to the desired legislative action, and each reflects a different ultimate
constitutional strategy settled on by Congress.
Based on those case studies, Part III evaluates the challenge, avoidance,
and application strategies. It concludes that each strategy holds both promise
and peril for Congress. In particular, it concludes that, while the application
strategy appears the safest and most straightforward, it is by no means

12

13
14
15
16
17
18

See, e.g., DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Univ. of Chicago Press 2011) (explaining the Lochner-era Court
in this way). Of course, those challenged state and federal regulatory programs were often cast in
terms of individual rights more broadly construed, for example, workers’ right to organize. See, e.g.,
REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (New York Univ. Press 2006) (framing the National Labor
Relations Act as vindicating workers’ quasi-constitutional rights).
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
Infra note 36.
Infra note 37.
Infra note 38.
Infra note 39.
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foolproof or risk free. Part IV briefly evaluates the implications of Part III’s
analysis. It concludes that the risks posed by each of these strategies requires
Congress to think long and hard as it deliberates on the proper constitutional
foundation for whatever civil rights legislation it is disposed to consider.
I.

RIGHTS-ENFORCING LEGISLATION: MULTIPLE ROUTES TO THE
SAME DESTINATION AND THE CHOICES THEY PRESENT

A. Multiple Routes to the Same Destination
Congress possesses broad legislative powers. Today, judicial scrutiny of
congressional power to enact a particular piece of legislation focuses on the
law’s subject-matter rather than Congress’s underlying goals. Thus, for
example, Congress may use its taxing power to impose a tax for regulatory
purposes, if the law raises at least some revenue.19 More relevantly for current
purposes, Congress can use its power to regulate interstate commerce to
promote civil rights, as long as Congress promotes that goal by regulating
interstate commerce or conduct that substantially affects it.20
While these developments provide Congress the flexibility to utilize a
broad array of powers to promote individual rights, that flexibility has also
triggered complaints about the resulting mismatch between regulatory goals
and the tools employed to achieve them. Two generations ago, Justice
Douglas criticized the Court’s use of the dormant Commerce Clause to
invalidate a state law criminalizing the importation of indigent persons, arguing
“that the right of persons to move freely from State to State occupies a more
protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of
cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines.”21 That concern led him to base
his concurrence on the Fourteenth Amendment right to interstate travel.22
Justice Jackson also concurred separately, for essentially the same reason.23
But Jackson added an element to Justice Douglas’s critique when he expressed

19

20

21
22
23

See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (“It is beyond serious question that a tax
does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the
activities taxed. The principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negligible, or
the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary.”) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). This understanding
rejects an older view that disabled Congress from enacting even facial regulations of interstate
commerce if Congress sought to promote a goal other than remedying problems with such commerce
itself. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (adopting this older understanding), overruled
by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (stating the modern rule).
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177–78 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring).

See id.
See id. at 181 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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concern about the likely effect of the majority’s use of the Commerce Clause
on both the commerce power itself and the legal status of individual rights.24
Congress’s explicit power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments25—
most notably, its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment26—provides a
more direct path for Congress to protect rights. However, the diverging
doctrinal paths taken by the Court’s Article I and enforcement power
doctrines have caused Congress to refrain from reflexively relying on its
enforcement power when considering rights-protecting legislation. Most
notably, the Court has long insisted that the power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment limits Congress to regulation of state action,27 while Congress’s
Article I powers focus primarily (though not exclusively) on regulation of
private entities.28 Another difference relates to the remedies available to
Congress when it legislates under these two different grants of authority.29
Tracking the distinction between Commerce Clause-based federal regulation
of the states and regulation of private parties, Congress’s spending power also
faces special limits when employed to grant money to states on the condition
that recipient states take certain action.30
Perhaps most importantly, each of these powers differs from the others in
the doctrinal tests that measure the scope of each power. While the Court has

24

25
26

27
28

29

30

See id. at 182 (“[T]he migrations of a human being, of whom it is charged that he possesses nothing
that can be sold and has no wherewithal to buy, do not fit easily into my notions as to what is
commerce. To hold that the measure of his rights is the commerce clause is likely to result eventually
either in distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human rights.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; amend. XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 2.
Because this power resides in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, this article sometimes refers
to that power as “the Section 5” power. Otherwise, references to the “enforcement power” or the
“Enforcement Clause” should be understood as referring to the Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power, unless the context indicates otherwise.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Indeed, one of the basic goals of the Constitutional Convention was to create a national government
that acted directly on individual Americans, rather than on the states. Today, Article I legislation
regulating states encounters limits that are inapplicable to legislation regulating private parties. See
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (prohibiting Commerce Clause-based regulation
that commandeers state governments); Seminole Tribe v. Fla. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (prohibiting
Commerce Clause-based regulation that makes unconsenting states liable for retrospective relief in
federal court); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (extending the Seminole Tribe rule to state court
lawsuits); see also Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (limiting the substance of
federal regulation when that regulation acts on states), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Compare Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (restricting remedies legislated pursuant to the
Commerce Clause when they act upon unconsenting states) with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976) (allowing such remedies when the law rests on Congress’s enforcement power).
See S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-212 (1987) (identifying several conditions that must be satisfied
in order for Congress to condition money it grants to states).
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trimmed Congress’s commerce and spending powers around the edges31 and
introduced uncertainty into what had been settled areas of law,32 those powers
remain largely intact from their mid-twentieth Century heights, while the
enforcement power has experienced marked cut-backs in the last quartercentury.33

B. The Necessity of Congressional Choice
The differences identified above have influenced Congress’s deliberations
about the constitutional foundation of individual rights legislation. Those
deliberations illustrate three strategies Congress has employed when
confronting Supreme Court personnel or doctrine that appear potentially
hostile to its constitutional authority.
One obvious response to such judicial hostility is to join issue and mount
a frontal challenge to judicial doctrine obstructing Congress’s desired policy.
Such a challenge entails Congress enacting the legislation it desires, and
grounding it squarely in the constitutional power that judicial doctrine limits.
As set forth in the case studies Part II examines, such challenges are high-risk
but also high-return moves: if the challenge succeeds, Congress has removed
the objectionable doctrine, but if it loses, that doctrine remains in place,
indeed, reaffirmed. Moreover, if the challenge lacked a fallback argument
based in another congressional power, a losing challenge means that the
legislation in question is struck down, with whatever immediate and long-term
wounds that loss inflicts.
Given these risks, an obvious alternative to challenges entails avoiding the
problematic doctrine by relying on a different congressional power.
Avoidance removes the risk inherent in challenging unfavorable doctrine. But
it also removes whatever long-term reward might flow from a successful
challenge. More immediately, avoidance raises whatever risks are inherent in

31

32
33

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (holding that Congress lacked the
Commerce Clause power to enact the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act);
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (holding that the civil cause of action provision of the Violence Against
Women Act exceeded the commerce power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (same,
with regard to the Gun Free School Zones Act); but see Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)
(upholding a provision of the Controlled Substances Act criminalizing possession of home-grown
and consumed marijuana); Nat’l Fed’n., 567 U.S. at 575–85 (Roberts, C.J., joined by two justices);
id. at 671–691 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by three justices) (all voting to strike down the conditional
spending aspect of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion, holding that the condition was
unconstitutionally coercive).
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (conceding the existence of that uncertainty in Commerce Clause
doctrine).
See Flores, 521 U.S. at 507.
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invoking the alternative power. While that latter observation might seem
nothing more than a truism, it bears wondering whether the Court—in
particular, a Court that is suspicious of Congress34—might exhibit skepticism of
that alternative power argument exactly because it suspects a congressional
attempt to circumvent the limits on the more obvious source of congressional
power. That suspicion might provoke cutbacks on that alternative power,
which in turn would apply more broadly.
Given that risk, a third strategy—”application”—presents itself. An
application strategy means what the label says: Congress does not avoid the
power in question, nor does it challenge the Court’s understanding of that
power—rather, it justifies its legislation as an application of judicial doctrine
governing that power. The application approach has much to recommend it.
It is modest, but still forthright about the civil rights goals Congress seeks to
achieve. It also fits neatly into the Court’s otherwise-restrictive post-Boerne
enforcement power template, which recognizes Congress’s authority to enact
prophylactic legislation extending beyond Court-stated Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence as long as it refrains from redefining it.35 But even
this power raises difficult questions that limit its effectiveness.
Part II of this Article presents four case studies of legislation either fully or
partially justified as rights-enforcing. These case studies illustrate the coping
mechanisms described above. Part III then evaluates those mechanisms
based on those case studies.
II. CASE STUDIES
This Part examines four case studies of congressional deliberations on civil
rights legislation from the last half-century: the public accommodations
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,36 the private right of action granted
by the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,37 the ENDA and Equality Acts
34

35
36

37

See, e.g., Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 189
(2011) (“[T]he Court is increasingly suspicious of ‘fact-finding’ that allows Congress to change the
balance of the constitutional structure.”). If anything, this suspicion has only grown since 2011. See,
e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down a critical provision of the Voting
Rights Act’s reauthorization because Congress used old data).
See text accompanying infra note 139.
Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241. Unless the context indicates otherwise, this article sometimes
refers to those provisions as “the Civil Rights Act” or the “CRA.” Of course, that statute addressed
much
more
than
public
accommodations
discrimination.
See
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=97 (summarizing the main features of the
law).
42 U.S.C. § 13981. This provision, which this Article sometimes shorthands as “VAWA,” gave
victims of gender-motivated crime a private right of action against their attackers. As did the Civil
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considered over the last quarter-century,38 and the Partial Birth Abortion Ban
Act of 2003.39 These bills required Congress to consider the appropriate
constitutional foundation for rights-promoting legislation.40 Each situation was
slightly different, and thus implicated different considerations as Congress
sought to adapt the legislation, and its constitutional grounding, to both the
Court’s personnel and its doctrine.

A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964

41

1. The Constitutional Backdrop in 1963
By 1963, Congress and the Kennedy Administration were primed to
consider the first significant civil rights legislation since Reconstruction.42
Advocates and pro-civil rights legislators planned to include in that legislation
public accommodations non-discrimination provisions.
Locating a
constitutional foundation for such provisions presented them with an
interesting problem. On the one hand, the Civil Rights Cases43 appeared to
reject the idea that the enforcement power authorized Congress to regulate
private parties. The existence of that longstanding precedent—even in the early
1960s it was two generations old—seemed to place a difficult hurdle in front of
any attempt to ground any public accommodations provisions on the
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. On the other hand, the midcentury Court’s tentative undermining of the state action rule raised hopes that
the Warren Court’s increasingly liberal tilt, when combined with the pressure
of the then-current lunch-counter sit-in cases, would prompt the justices to
grasp the opportunity to overrule that precedent if confronted with a federal
public accommodations law grounded on the enforcement power.44

38
39
40

41
42
43
44

Rights Act, see supra. note 36, the Violence Against Women Act did more than provide this right of
action. However, unless the context indicates otherwise, references to “VAWA” are to this particular
provision.
These bills, never enacted, would have prohibited most employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and, in later iterations, gender identity. See, e.g., S.B. 815 § 4(a) (113th Cong.).
Pub. L. No. 108–105, 117 Stat. 1201.
Obviously, the 2003 abortion law is easily understandable as a rights-restricting law; indeed, it was
challenged (unsuccessfully) on exactly that ground. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). But
its proponents saw it, at least in part, through the lens of promoting fetal rights. That perspective—
indeed, the very fact that the legislation could be seen both as rights-restricting and rights-promoting—
makes it an interesting subject for study.
This discussion relies heavily on Schmidt, infra note 163.
Modest civil rights statutes had been enacted in 1957 and 1960, the former of which was the first civil
rights statute enacted by Congress since Reconstruction.
109 U.S. at 3.
See Schmidt, infra note 163 at 784 (noting the speculation raised by the mid-Century Court’s tentative
retreat from a rigid state action rule). Indeed, Professor Schmidt has concluded from a review of the
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Competing with that option was the Commerce Clause. By the early 1960s
the nation was two decades removed from the seminal opinions of the late
1930s and early 1940s that vastly expanded the reach of Congress’s power to
regulate interstate commerce. Still, the laws that prompted those opinions
were direct regulations of the marketplace, motivated by economic
considerations.45 Nevertheless, in 1941 the Court rejected the idea that a noncommerce motivation for a federal law removed the Commerce Clause as a
source of power for that law.46 Moreover, cases from that era construed
Congress’s other Article I powers in ways also deemphasizing Congress’s
motivation.47 The Kennedy Administration’s Solicitor General, Archibald
Cox, expressed confidence that a public accommodations bill would be
upheld under the commerce power.48

2. Choosing the Commerce Clause
While both constitutional foundations appeared at least plausible, during
1963 the Kennedy Administration gradually shifted its primary focus from the
enforcement power to the commerce power. While the former enjoyed the
political advantage of appealing to Republicans who still claimed the
Fourteenth Amendment as their historical legacy,49 and while it also appeared
most logical given the bill’s civil rights motives,50 expert legal advice counseled
against primary reliance on the enforcement power. Those experts worried
about the integrity of the federal courts if legislation greatly expanding the class
of entities subject to the Fourteenth Amendment forced the Court to
harmonize such an expansion with its own judicial doctrine. For example,
Harvard professor Paul Freund’s congressional testimony warned that
grounding the bill in the Enforcement Clause would raise difficult questions
about that law’s effect on the Court’s self-executing Section 1 doctrine. Freund
assumed that principles underlying Section 5 legislation would also apply in
Section 1 adjudication.51 Thus, for example, abrogation of the state action

45

46
47
48
49
50
51

justices’ papers that a majority, and potentially all, of them were in the early 1960s willing to uphold
enforcement legislation jettisoning the doctrine. See id. at 803–804.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding a law regulating agricultural
production); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding a law regulating manufacturing
of items with poorly-paid labor); Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(upholding a law regulating labor relations in a manufacturing facility).
See supra note 20.
See supra note 19.
See Schmidt, infra note 163 at 813.
See Schmidt, infra note at 811.

See id.
See Freund Statement, infra note 163 at 1187.
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principle by Congress would mean that the private parties Congress thereby
regulated would be susceptible to all Fourteenth Amendment requirements in
Section 1 litigation.
While Freund’s testimony later backtracked somewhat,52 the Kennedy
Administration adopted this argument as it gradually shifted toward the
Commerce Clause approach. In the fall of 1963, Attorney General Robert
Kennedy reiterated Freund’s concern that an enforcement power grounding
for the bill would greatly limit the realm of private liberty if the bill’s
Fourteenth Amendment-based coverage of private entities thereby subjected
those entities to the Fourteenth Amendment for all purposes. He raised the
specter of a private business that, because its customer selection practices were
covered by an enforcement power-based bill, would also have to satisfy due
process if it wished to fire an employee, or a religious school that, again, if
covered by the bill’s enforcement power-based anti-discrimination provisions,
would be prohibited from conducting Bible readings.53 By contrast, the
commerce power option allowed Congress near-complete control over the
bill’s scope without raising any broader implications.54
To be sure, the Administration’s primary concern was with the more
practical issue of limiting the businesses the bill would cover, in order to ensure
political support from congressional moderates. Pending in the fall of 1963
was a proposal covering a wide variety of private businesses that operated
through state-granted licenses, with that licensure furnishing the justification
for use of the enforcement power. Seeking to head off that Fourteenth
Amendment-based expansion in the bill’s coverage, the Administration
expressed the concern, noted above, about the unintended consequences of
using the enforcement power. That political maneuver succeeded, and
legislators converged on a more limited coverage formula for public
accommodations, based in the commerce power. The Court quickly and
unanimously upheld the public accommodations provision under the
Commerce Clause.55 Still, despite the justices’ strong support for allowing
Congress to enact enforcement legislation dispensing with the state action

52
53
54

55

See Freund Statement, infra note 163 at 1189 (suggesting a decoupling of rules enacted in Section 5
legislation from rules applicable in analogous Section 1 litigation).
See Schmidt, infra note 163, at 816.
See Freund Statement, infra note 163 at 1187 (“The Commerce Clause ‘is primarily a grant of
legislative power to Congress, which can be exercised in large or small measure, flexibly,
pragmatically, tentatively, progressively, while guaranteed rights, if they are declared to be conferred
by the Constitution, are not to be granted or withheld in fragments.’”), quoted in Schmidt, infra note,
163 at 813.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 241; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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requirement,56 the Warren Court never again got a clear opportunity to
confront the state action question.

B. VAWA
1. The Doctrinal Backdrop and Application Strategy
Three decades later, the Congress considering VAWA confronted a very
different doctrinal backdrop. In retrospect, it is clear that VAWA arose at the
very end of the period featuring the most expansive understanding of
congressional power in our history, and on the cusp of the federalism
revolution of 1990s. In the early 1990s, the most recent precedents governing
Congress’s commerce and enforcement powers suggested VAWA would
encounter little constitutional difficulty.57 United States v. Lopez,58 which
began the Court’s ultimately-tentative cutback on the commerce power, lay in
the future,59 as did the Court’s limitation on Article I-grounded remedies on
state violators of federal law.60 City of Boerne v. Flores’s cutback on the
enforcement power lay similarly in the future.61
Given that doctrinal backdrop, one can understand the different tone of
legislators’ and experts’ deliberations about the constitutional foundation for
VAWA’s private right of action, as compared with its earlier deliberations
about the CRA’s public accommodations provisions.62 Academic experts
56
57

58
59

60

61
62

See supra note 44.
See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (upholding, as Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement legislation, the Voting Rights Act’s restrictions on state voting practices by
historically-discriminatory jurisdictions that produced racially disparate impacts, even though the
Fifteenth Amendment prohibited only intentional racial discrimination, because Congress could have
“rationally” concluded that actions producing such effects risked being infected by invidious intent);
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding a federal law
regulating coal mining reclamation as valid regulation under the Commerce Clause, employing
similarly deferential review).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
To be sure, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Lopez striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act came
down in 1993, during the period Congress was deliberating on VAWA. However, critical parts of
that deliberation occurred in 1991, before the appellate decision in Lopez and, indeed, even before
the conduct at issue in Lopez occurred. Compare infra note 74 (citing an October 1991
congressional report reprinting a version of the bill inserting findings relating to VAWA’s commerce
and enforcement power foundations) with United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993),
aff’d, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (noting that the alleged conduct occurred in 1992).
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44 (prohibiting Congress from using its Commerce Clause power to
make unconsenting states liable for retrospective relief); College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 666
(holding that a state did not impliedly consent to the imposition of retrospective relief for violating a
federal statute when it engaged in conduct that statute regulated).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
An additional reason for this different tone was the view that VAWA was less vulnerable than the
CRA to the Civil Rights Cases’ state action rule, since VAWA was designed to respond to state
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testifying about the VAWA provision’s constitutionality expressed little worry
about its validity under the Commerce Clause, with one of them exchanging
humorous banter with a senator about the laxity of the requirement that
Commerce Clause-based legislation exhibit a rational connection to interstate
commerce.63 To be sure, Professor Cass Sunstein, one of the testifying experts,
did suggest adding findings documenting the connection between gendermotivated violence and interstate commerce.64 While he did not explicitly
explain the reason for his suggestion, the context in which he made it indicates
that he was urging Congress to hew as closely as possible to the CRA’s
example, which featured findings connecting racial discrimination in public
accommodations with interstate commerce.65
Interestingly, Professor Sunstein expressed slightly less certainty about the
breadth of the enforcement power. He noted the well-known pair of
rationales Justice Brennan had proffered to uphold the enforcement
legislation challenged in Katzenbach v. Morgan:66 the “substantive” theory that
purported to authorize Congress to act on its own independent interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the “remedial” theory that still gave
Congress broad power, but only to remedy judicially-acknowledged
constitutional violations.67
Professor Sunstein characterized the first
justification as one that no Court subsequent to Morgan had ever accepted,
but he nevertheless concluded that the more restrained, remedial reading
would likely support the law, as long as Congress “emphasize[d] legislative
findings of equal protection violations”68 that would justify VAWA’s civil
remedy.

63
64
65
66
67
68

governments’ failure to prosecute gender-motivated crime. Ultimately, this rationale for VAWA’s
conformance with that rule failed. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598 (striking down VAWA’s civil
remedy provision as exceeding Congress’s enforcement power, mainly because that provision
regulated private parties). Nevertheless, enforcement power doctrine between the CRA and VAWA
(and thus, before Morrison) had changed as well, in ways favorable to enforcement legislation. While
the Court was never squarely confronted with the opportunity to overrule the Civil Rights Cases, see
supra Part II.A, the Court nevertheless embraced a much expanded conception of the enforcement
power in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Morgan, which formed part of the doctrinal
backdrop to Congress’s deliberations on VAWA, suggested that VAWA’s civil remedy provision was
likely constitutional, especially given the argument that that provision responded to sexually
discriminatory state law enforcement. See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System, 102nd
Cong. 118–22 [hereinafter “April 1991 Hearing”] (statement of Cass Sunstein).
April 1991 Hearing at 108.
See id. at 108–109.
See id. at 116–117.
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
April 1991 Hearing, supra note 62, at 120–122.
Id. at 121. The context of his comments indicate that he made this suggestion, at least in part, to
dissuade Congress from relying on its power to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause, given
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Beyond these details, Congress’s deliberations about VAWA reflect a
fundamental difference between the circumstances confronting that legislation
and those surrounding the CRA. The CRA confronted Congress with a stark
choice between a fairly secure Commerce Clause foundation and an
enforcement power argument that, while rhetorically and politically attractive
to some,69 entailed some measure of risk and complication.70 By contrast,
VAWA’s closer connection to state action seemed at the time to make its
enforcement power path more secure than the CRA’s,71 while the CRA cases
themselves72 seemed to conclusively secure the Commerce Clause path. Thus,
for the Congresses considering VAWA, the challenge was simply to craft the
statute—and in particular, any findings supporting it—to conform with what
seemed, in the early 1990s, the generous amounts of power the Enforcement
and Commerce Clauses both gave Congress. In this sense, one can
understand Congress, and the experts advising it, as embracing an application
strategy.
Congress’s deliberations reveal an additional point. Professor Sunstein’s
testimony observed that the equal protection enforcement theory he
recommended obviated the need “to ask the complex, controversial, and
unresolved question whether Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allows
Congress to reach purely private action.”73 His attempt to shift focus away from
that issue can be understood as an avoidance strategy.
Nevertheless, these strategies failed.

2. The Court’s Response
Several months later, the Senate produced a version of the bill that
included findings relevant to the VAWA provision’s Enforcement Clause and

69
70
71
72
73

what he believed to be the more difficult enforcement power question that reliance would raise. See
id. at 122 and 122 n.*.
See text accompanying supra note 49.
See text accompanying supra notes 51–54.
Nevertheless, the Court rejected VAWA’s enforcement power foundation. See infra Part II.B.3.
Supra note 55.
April 1991 Hearing, supra note 62 at 122. It is unclear why he thought an equal protection grounding,
as opposed to the privileges and immunities grounding reflected in the then-current version of the
bill, would obviate the private action question. Section 301 of the then-existing bill found that “[a]ll
persons within the United States shall have the same rights, privileges and immunities in every State
as is enjoyed by all other persons to be free from crimes of violence motivated by the victim’s gender.”
See id. at 399. Perhaps he thought that emphasizing those rights necessarily focused attention on the
private perpetrators of such violence, rather than on their state enablers, with the result that such a
focus would raise the Section 5 state action issue.
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Commerce Clause foundations.74 Those findings eventually disappeared from
the bill that was eventually enacted in 1994.75 But the lack of formal findings
ultimately played only a secondary role in the Supreme Court’s rejection of
the provision’s enforcement power grounding.76
Addressing the enforcement power argument, the Court acknowledged
Congress’s “voluminous record” of evidence identifying gender bias in law
enforcement. But it also cited a more fundamental problem: the provision
regulated private parties (by giving victims of gender-based violence a cause of
action against their attackers), and thus violated the rule, dating from the Civil
Rights Cases, limiting enforcement legislation to laws regulating government
actors.77 The Court acknowledged that the VAWA provision responded to
states’ failure to prosecute gender-motivated assaults, but it concluded that the
remedy—the provision of a private right of action—failed Boerne’s
“congruence and proportionality” test exactly because it regulated private
parties.78 The Court rejected the argument that the cases establishing that rule
could be distinguished by the lack of state involvement in the underlying
conduct, in contrast to the state law enforcement gender bias that motivated
VAWA.79
Mapping this analysis onto the congressional strategies Part I identified,80
one can conclude that the Court’s rigid and arguably beefed-up81 application

74

75

76
77
78

79

80
81

See S. REP. NO. 102–97, at 27-28 (1991) (reprinting Section 301(a) of the amended version of
VAWA, which included findings relating to state violations of equal protection and the interstate
commerce effects of gender-motivated violence). Cf. April 1991 Hearing at 398–99 (prior version of
Section 301(a), lacking such findings). See also Victoria Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and
Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 15 WISC. WOMEN’S L. J.
257, 281 (2000) (noting this sequence).
Those findings were deleted in the House-Senate conference, according to a Senate staffer, for
reasons unrelated to their substance. See Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet,
at 292.
But see infra note 79.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621–22.
Id. at 626 (stating, immediately after reciting the congruence and proportionality test, that “Section
13981 is not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might
not itself proscribe; it is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed
criminal acts motivated by gender bias.”).
See id. at 624–25. To be sure, the record compiled by Congress did matter to the enforcement
power analysis in one small way: almost as an afterthought, the Court concluded its Section 5 analysis
by observing that the provision applied nationwide, even though Congress’s evidence did not reveal
a nationwide problem with gender-biased law enforcement. See id. at 626–27.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 664–65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that earlier precedent striking
down enforcement power legislation regulating private parties had described that legislation as
responding to purely private conduct, not state government failures); id. at 665–66 (arguing that the
Court had never required Congress to prove that a constitutional problem existed in every state as a
condition of enacting enforcement legislation applicable in every state).
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of the state action rule frustrated the application and avoidance strategies by
moving the goalposts—that is, altering the underlying law Congress had
attempted to apply (and partially avoid82). The Court read the Nineteenth
Century cases enforcing the state action rule as involving situations, just like
VAWA, where state action lay behind the private conduct. But those cases
did not have to be thus read: rather, as Justice Breyer argued in dissent,83 they
could have been read as situations where, unlike VAWA, “state action” was
absent. Thus, as Professor Sunstein suggested in his testimony, VAWA could
have been understood as a case that simply did not implicate the state action
limitation.84
This understanding of Morrison teaches a larger lesson: For a Court
committed to an agenda—as the late Rehnquist Court was committed to a
federalism agenda—even an application strategy may fail if it threatens that
underlying agenda. VAWA’s use of the enforcement power threatened that
agenda, by opening new vistas for enforcement power-based regulation of
private conduct in response to state government misconduct. Morrison’s
enforcement power analysis reflects the Court’s response to a threat it
perceived from a strategy as modest as application.
So does Morrison’s Commerce Clause analysis. After Congress took
Professor Sunstein’s advice and created a record documenting the interstate
commerce effects of gender-motivated violence, the Court refused to give that
record decisive effect. It reasoned that doing so would frustrate the Court’s
agenda of demarcating a sphere of conduct exclusively regulable by states.85
Thus, even though in Lopez the Court had suggested that it might uphold
aggressive Commerce Clause regulation if Congress provided findings linking
the regulated activity to interstate commerce,86 in Morrison the Court retracted
that commitment. Thus, just as with the enforcement power, the Court
frustrated Congress’s strategy of “applying” existing Commerce Clause
doctrine by altering that doctrine. Importantly for current purposes, that
alteration may well have been provoked by that very act of application.

82
83
84

85

86

See supra note 73.
See supra note 81.
See April 1991 Hearings, supra note 62 at 122 (“On the argument outlined above, Congress is
responding to an equal protection problem in the administration of state and local law by state and
local governmental authorities. It is not responding to private acts at all . . . .”).
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (“In these cases, Congress’ findings are substantially weakened by the
fact that they rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if
we are to maintain the Constitution’s enumeration of powers.”).
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 (explaining that findings might demonstrate a connection between
regulated conduct and interstate commerce that was not “visible to the naked eye”).
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C. ENDA
1. The Evolving Doctrinal Context
Congress faced a different and evolving set of issues when it considered
the constitutionality of legislation restricting sexual orientation (and, in later
iterations, gender identity) discrimination in employment. Such legislation—
usually entitled ENDA and, later, the Equality Act—was introduced first in
1974 and reintroduced with increasing frequency over time.87
Even limiting our examination to the last thirty years reveals that
Congress’s deliberations on ENDA’s constitutionality spanned very different
doctrinal eras. Most importantly, the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida88 removed the Commerce Clause as a source of
authority for ENDA provisions rendering state government employers liable
for retrospective relief.89 Seminole Tribe limited Congress’s options. A
challenge to that case was implausible. Seminole Tribe was a recent decision—
unlike the Civil Rights Cases, it was not an old chestnut handed down by a
long-ago Court facing a different world that Congress could reasonably suspect
the current Court would be willing to reconsider. Indeed, while Seminole
Tribe was decided by a slim 5-4 majority, that same majority proved durable,
ruling for states in a long series of federalism cases decided from the mid1990s to the early 2000s.90 Unlike the Civil Rights Cases in the early 1960s,
throughout the period in question here Congress had no reason to think that
a challenge to Seminole Tribe might succeed.
Avoidance remained an option. Indeed, that strategy surfaced in at least
some iterations of ENDA, which relied on Congress’s spending power to
render acceptance of federal funding “for any program or activity of a State” a

87

88
89

90

See Jeremy Brinster, Note, Taking Congruence and Proportionality Seriously, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV.
580, 595–599 (2020) (recounting the history of this legislation); see also H. REP. NO. 110–406, 2-10
(1996) (recounting this history up to the 110th Congress).
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Throughout this period there appeared to be no serious concern about the constitutionality, under
the Commerce Clause, of ENDA’s applicability to private employers (including the applicability of
any retrospective relief provisions). This is unsurprising, since even Lopez recognized broad
congressional power to regulate economic activity, including, presumably, the employer-employee
relationship.
See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (1995); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Idaho v. Coeur
d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at
627 (1999); College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 666 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999);
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356 (2001); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62 (2000) (all 5-4 opinions ruling for states in
federalism cases).
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waiver of that state’s sovereign immunity to claims arising under the statute.91
Nevertheless, despite the availability of what appeared, in the post-South
Dakota v. Dole92 period, to be an easy constitutional path to enacting
retrospective remedies against states,93 most post-Seminole Tribe versions of
ENDA focused on the enforcement power foundation for the law. This
emphasis is interesting in itself, at it suggests the enforcement power’s
rhetorical attractiveness as the constitutional home for anti-discrimination
legislation.94 More generally, the difficulty of the Commerce Clause route and
the apparent attractiveness of the Enforcement Clause path combined to
create a situation in which the discussions about ENDA’s constitutional
foundations largely took the form, not of a comparison of the commerce and
enforcement powers as distinct and equally plausible sources of congressional
power to enact the law’s remedies, but instead of a focused argument that
ENDA was constitutional as an application of the enforcement power.95
Such application was complicated by the evolution of both that
enforcement power jurisprudence and the Court’s underlying sexual
orientation equality jurisprudence. Consider first the enforcement power
issue. Before the 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,96 the relevant
enforcement power analysis was governed by the generous standards of cases
such as Katzenbach v. Morgan97 and City of Rome v. United States.98 Between

91

92
93

94
95

96
97
98

E.g., H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 11(b)(1). To complicate matters further, these waiver provisions
effectively resurrected the Commerce Clause foundation for the full versions of ENDA—that is, the
versions that included the full panoply of remedies Congress sought to impose on states. Whether
one calls this situation “avoidance”—that is, avoidance of Seminole Tribe—or application—that is,
application of the Court’s congressional spending power jurisprudence—is more a matter of semantics
than substance.
Supra note 30.
See, e.g., Andrew Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Conditional Spending Paradox, 2013 WISC. L.
REV. 339, 348 (2013) (“The consensus view of commentators, supported by twenty-five years of
decisions following Dole, was that the decision represented a blank check to Congress.”).
See Schmidt, supra note 50 (noting a similar intuition among the congresspersons considering the
CRA).
See Judith Olans Brown & Peter D. Enrich, Nostalgic Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1,
34 (2000) (“The changes wrought in both the Commerce Clause and the sovereign immunity
doctrines have one clear corollary: to place at center stage the scope of congressional authority under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. By a process of doctrinal elimination, Section Five [of
the Fourteenth Amendment] seems to have become . . . the primary path by which Congress can
supercede [sic] the states’ sovereign immunity.”). Nevertheless, the qualifier “largely” is required due
to the continued existence of the spending power as a source of power, not to enact ENDA, but to
make its remedies effective despite Seminole Tribe. See supra note 91.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
446 U.S. 156 (1980). Rome considered Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation, but during
this period it was not thought that different standards governed the different Enforcement Clauses.
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1997 and 2001, Boerne’s more restrictive “congruence and proportionality”
standard governed, but questions remained about how stringently the Court
would apply that test. Finally, by 2001, the Court’s application of Boerne to
equal protection-enforcing legislation made it clear that ENDA would face
difficult questions in an enforcement power challenge.99 In particular, those
applications of Boerne established that the suspectness of the discrimination
the enforcement legislation targeted would be a crucial consideration in the
Court’s evaluation of that legislation’s constitutionality.
While the relevant enforcement power doctrine was evolving, so too was
the Court’s attitude toward sexual orientation discrimination. Until 1996, LGB
persons100 had never won a constitutional victory at the Court;101 indeed, until
2003, it remained constitutional to criminalize same-sex intimacy.102 Thus, any
consideration of ENDA as enforcement legislation required a more explicit
congressional statement affirming their equal protection rights, to make up for
the lack of any such statement in Supreme Court caselaw. Romer v. Evans103
and Lawrence v. Texas,104 not to mention the marriage cases some years later,105
clearly altered the constitutional status of sexual orientation.106 But they still
left that status unclear. Those cases never even broached the question whether
sexual orientation discrimination was a suspect or quasi-suspect class, let alone

The Civil Rights Cases posed no threat to ENDA’s constitutionality as enforcement legislation, since
99

100

101
102

103
104
105

106

the only issue on which the enforcement power mattered was ENDA’s direct application to states.
See, e.g., Garrett 531 U.S. at 356 (applying skeptical scrutiny to the enforcement power argument for
the employment provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Board of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000) (applying similarly skeptical scrutiny to the analogous argument for the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
The constitutional status of transgender discrimination—the “T” in “LGBT”—presents a distinct,
though related, question. This summary of Congress’s deliberations on ENDA omits consideration
of that question, since throughout much of the period under discussion ENDA was limited to sexual
orientation discrimination and did not purport to address gender identity discrimination.
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a Colorado law that denied LGB persons
protected status under state law).
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas law criminalizing same-sex
intimacy, and overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which had upheld a Georgia
sodomy law challenged as an unconstitutional infringement on LGB persons’ right to such intimacy).
Supra note 101.
Supra note 102.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (striking down same-sex marriage bans); United States
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (striking down a federal law defining marriage, for federal law
purposes, as the union of one man and one woman).
Lawrence rested on a due process ground, but Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion nevertheless
imported equality considerations into his analysis. See 539 U.S. at 575 (“Equality of treatment and
the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty
are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”); see also
id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (concurring in the decision to strike down the Texas law on
equal protection grounds).
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decided that it was. Indeed, they provided little discussion of sexual
orientation’s constitutional status more generally, divorced from each case’s
particular subject-matter.107
Given that the Court’s post-Boerne equal protection enforcement power
jurisprudence turned heavily on the answer to the suspect class question,108 this
string of gay rights victories nevertheless left unclear how steep a climb ENDA
would face if its enforcement power foundation was challenged. However, the
example set by Board of Trustees v. Garrett,109 where the Court dismissed the
significance, for enforcement power purposes, of the Court’s rational
basis/animus decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,110
suggested that Romer’s analogous rational basis/animus analysis, and, later, the
equally opaque constitutional analyses in the marriage cases, might not suffice
to place sexual orientation equality legislation on a firm enforcement power
foundation.

2. Congress’s Response
Given these ambiguities, it is instructive to note Congress’s elaborate
attempts to defend ENDA as an application of the Court’s enforcement power
and equal protection jurisprudence.111 That application faced obstacles. By
2001, it was clear that the Court would look skeptically at any equal protection
enforcement legislation that targeted discrimination against non-suspect
classifications, such as sexual orientation.112 Perhaps unsurprisingly, then,
much of Congress’s argumentation about ENDA’s constitutionality focused
on establishing that sexual orientation was indeed a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification.113 This was not a far-fetched argument in the late 1990s and early
2000s; at that point, the Court’s last serious application of suspect class analysis

107 See, e.g., Windsor, 570 U.S. at 763–774 (focusing on marriage); but see Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 660–
662; (discussing the history of sexual orientation discrimination).
108 See infra note 123.
109 531 U.S. at 366–367, 366 n.4.
110 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
111 Even after the cutbacks on the commerce power in Lopez and Morrison, it remained clear that
ENDA’s focus on employment rendered it valid under the Commerce Clause, including its
application to state government employers, even if, after Seminole Tribe, that grounding did not
allow the imposition of retrospective remedies against states. See Harry Litman & Mark D.
Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of
Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921, 977 (1997) (commenting on Lopez’s
limited effect on congressional power).
112 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
113 See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act: Ensuring Opportunity for all Americans, 111th
Cong. 124–127 (2009) (statement of ACLU); H. R. REP. NO. 110-406, at 29 (2007) (stating that LGB
persons satisfy the traditional criteria for suspect class status).
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lay only a decade-and-a-half in the past,114 and the then-recent decision in
Romer v. Evans115 gave observers reason to think that formal suspect class
status was simply a matter of time.116
Despite the plausibility of Congress’s suspect class argument, it is striking
to see Congress attempting to conform its legislation, not to underlying
constitutional meaning, but to doctrinal rules, such as the suspect class/tiered
scrutiny structure, that courts created to implement that meaning. As Justice
Breyer pointed out in his Garrett dissent, those doctrinal rules are grounded
in justices’ (appropriate) concerns about their lack of both democratic
legitimacy and institutional competence to second-guess legislative
classifications. As such, he observed, those rules should play no limiting role
when Congress acts via enforcement legislation.117 Scholars have agreed,
criticizing what Robert Post and Reva Siegel have called the Garrett majority’s
“juricentric” understanding of the enforcement power.118
For our purposes, the most relevant observation is that Congress’s
embrace of such doctrine-based arguments—such as the argument that sexual
orientation is a suspect classification—risks elevating such judicial decision
rules to the status of core constitutional meaning. Put slightly differently, that
embrace creates the risk that Congress, when staking out its enforcement
power authority, implicitly accepts the terms of debate set by the Court.
However, Congress’s constitutional defense of ENDA also sought to apply
more fundamental constitutional law. Beyond the suspect class argument,
another marked feature of ENDA’s defense was Congress’s insistence that
sexual orientation employment discrimination is irrational and thus
unconstitutional, a conclusion that thereby justified ENDA as enforcement
legislation.119 At one level, this argument was just as doctrine-specific as the
suspect class argument. After all, rational basis review constitutes part of the
tiered scrutiny structure to which the suspect class idea is inextricably tied.
Thus, arguing that sexual orientation-based employment discrimination was

114 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
115 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
116 See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, Principled Silence, 106 YALE L.J. 247, 250 (1996) (arguing that
the example of sex discrimination, which proceeded from a rational basis strike-down to an argument
for conferral of suspect class status, could be applied to sexual orientation in light of Romer).
117 See 531 U.S. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“There is simply no reason to require Congress, seeking
to determine facts relevant to the exercise of its § 5 authority, to adopt rules or presumptions that
reflect a court’s institutional limitations.”).
118 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003).
119 See, e.g., H. R. REP. NO. 110-406, at 15 (2007).
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irrational essentially slotted ENDA into that doctrinal structure, allowing
Congress to create remedies for unconstitutional discrimination.
But Congress’s insistence on the irrationality of sexual orientation
employment discrimination also spoke to a deeper and broader constitutional
law rule, one that transcends the suspect class/tiered scrutiny doctrinal
structure. A fundamental rule of equal protection—indeed, of constitutional
law more generally—requires that government regulate only in pursuit of a
public purpose.120 If we understand the rationality requirement121 in those
terms—that is, as stating a core constitutional commitment rather than a
judicially-crafted decision rule—then Congress’s insistence that sexual
orientation employment discrimination is irrational becomes understandable
as an attempt to pierce the doctrinal veil of suspect class/tiered scrutiny
analysis, and to justify ENDA as an application of that core commitment.

3. ENDA’s Lessons
Because ENDA was never enacted, and now has been mooted by judicial
decision,122 we will never know how the Court would have responded to
Congress’s constitutional arguments. Still, the ENDA example reveals that a
successful application strategy requires that the Court be willing to defer to
Congress’s argumentation, about either the Court’s doctrinal rules (the
argument for suspect class status for sexual orientation) or the core
constitutional law those rules implement (the argument that sexual orientation
employment discrimination is irrational).
The Court’s post-Boerne enforcement power jurisprudence makes clear
that such deference is not forthcoming. Indeed, the only time since Boerne

120 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the Future of
Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 228–29 (2011) (“Rational-basis scrutiny, as traditionally
understood, flows from a presupposition of American constitutionalism so basic and pervasive that
it is easy to overlook: in its dealings with persons, the American government is under a constitutional
obligation to act rationally. Rationality in turn requires both that public actions make sense and that
they make good sense, that they have some legitimate purpose.”) (emphasis in original).
121 Note that the text speaks of a “rationality” requirement, not the “rational basis” standard. That latter
standard, with all its presumptions in favor of the challenged legislative action, is a component of the
tiered scrutiny structure this Article identifies as a judicial decision aid, rather than a core
constitutional rule. Compare Garrett, 531 U.S. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the rational
basis standard as a judicial decision aid) with Powell, supra. note 120 (discussing the rationality
requirement as a core constitutional commitment).
122 See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (holding that Title VII of the CRA’s prohibition
on sex discrimination in employment prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity). Subsequent gay rights legislation, such as the currently-pending Equality Act, would extend
anti-discrimination protections to realms not covered by the holding in Bostock. See, e.g., Human
Rights Campaign, “The Equality Act,’ https://www.hrc.org/resources/the-equality-act.
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that the Court has shown such deference is when Congress legislates to protect
a group the Court itself has denominated as suspect or quasi-suspect.123 The
irony, of course, is that such deference therefore rests on an initial suspect
class determination that remains the Court’s to make. More fundamentally,
the Court’s insistence on pegging the deference it accords enforcement
legislation to the Court-announced scrutiny tier it assigns the discrimination
that legislation targets reflects an unwillingness to allow Congress to transcend
the tiered scrutiny structure. To repeat Justice Breyer’s complaint in Garrett,
that structure reflects healthy judicial self-restraint rather than core
constitutional meaning.124 As such, it should not play a determinative role in
deciding enforcement power cases or even deciding how much deference
Congress enjoys when it enacts enforcement legislation.
By contrast, the irrationality argument Congress made in its ENDA
defense could be interpreted as a congressional attempt to apply core
constitutional meaning. However, given the Court’s unwillingness to allow
Congress a meaningful role in implementing even the judicial decision rules
reflected in its tiered scrutiny structure, there is little reason to be optimistic
that it would share its power to state and apply core constitutional meaning.
Without meaningful deference, this variant of the application approach
remains limited indeed.

D. The Partial-Birth Abortion Act
A decade after its deliberations on VAWA, Congress considered a very
different piece of legislation, the PBABA—a bill banning so-called partial-birth
abortions.125 While such legislation had been considered in the 1990s, federal
action became increasingly important to anti-abortion forces after the
Supreme Court struck down an analogous Nebraska restriction in 2000. The
five-justice majority in that case, Stenberg v. Carhart,126 faulted the state law for
both its vagueness and its failure to include an exception for women’s health.
That latter failing was particularly relevant to abortion rights doctrine, given
the governing law requiring health exceptions from any abortion restriction127

123 See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (“Because the standard for
demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than our
rational-basis test . . . it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations”
justifying sex equality enforcement legislation) (citation omitted).
124 See supra note 117; see also supra note 118 (similar critique from scholars).
125 Supra note 39.
126 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
127 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
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and the trial court’s finding in Stenberg that the outlawed abortion method was
sometimes the safest one for some women.128
Congress, when it turned to abortion legislation in Stenberg’s aftermath,
had little difficulty with the vagueness issue, crafting legislation defining the
prohibited procedure more precisely. But the latter obstacle posed a more
serious problem. Stenberg’s conclusion that the Constitution required a
health exception seemed to mean that any absolute or rigid prohibition on
“partial-birth” abortions, no matter how finely-crafted, would encounter
resistance at the Court.129 Unsurprisingly, then, Congress’s constitutional
argumentation turned heavily on what the PBABA characterized as Congress’s
broad power to find facts, in particular, facts about the need for a health
exception.130
More interesting from an enforcement power perspective are the
admittedly sparse statements in Congress’s deliberations suggesting that the
PBABA enforced Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because the PBABA
limited the availability of certain types of abortions, it is most naturally
understood as limiting constitutionally-protected rights. However, during its
consideration of the PBABA Congress and individual congresspersons
sometimes suggested that the law sought to protect constitutionally-cognizable
rights to life. Most notably, one of the statute’s findings concluded:
A child that is completely born is a full, legal person entitled to
constitutional protections afforded a “person” under the United States
Constitution. Partial-birth abortions involve the killing of a child that is
in the process, in fact mere inches away from, becoming a “person.”
Thus, the government has a heightened interest in protecting the life
of the partially-born child.”131
Such a finding hints at a congressional conclusion that the PBABA could
be justified as prophylactic legislation designed to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment interest in life.132
128 See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 928–29, 936–37 (describing those findings and their implications for the
Court’s decision).
129 The PABA itself was not an absolute ban, as it exempted from the ban situations where the
woman’s life was at risk. See infra. note 135.
130 Partial-Birth Abortion Act, Pub. L. No. 108-105 §§ 2(6)-(12).
131 Id. at § 2(14)(H).
132 This language could easily be read as recognizing the state’s interest in valuing the potentiality of postnatal life inherent in the fetus—an interest Casey recognized. See 505 U.S. at 871 (acknowledging
“the interest of the State in the protection of potential life.”). If that that interest belongs to the state,
rather than the fetus itself, it would be non-cognizable as a Fourteenth Amendment interest, and thus
also for enforcement power purposes. Nevertheless, individual congresspersons appeared interested
in locating the interest in the fetus itself, thus triggering Congress’s Section 5 authority. See, e.g., 114
CONG. REC. S10,491 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (“[A] legislative ban on
partial-birth abortions is constitutional. Indeed, allowing this life-taking procedure to continue would
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To be sure, this language—aside from its sparseness—cannot be understood
as a full-on challenge to Supreme Court doctrine. It would constitute such a
challenge only if it reflected a blunt congressional assertion of fetal
personhood. In Roe v. Wade, the Court explicitly rejected that proposition,133
a move it acknowledged as critical to any recognition of an abortion right.134
An assertion in the PBABA of fetal personhood would thus have directly
challenged the abortion right, except perhaps when the pregnancy threatened
the woman’s very life, in which case that assertion would have created a need
to choose between the lives of two “persons”—the woman and the
(congressionally-recognized) fetus.135 A clearer challenge to the Court’s
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment would be hard to imagine, even
without also adding the state action problem attending any enforcement statute
prohibiting private parties from performing or procuring abortions.136
Again, though, the careful drafting of the finding quoted above137 indicates
a less direct challenge to the Court’s abortion rights jurisprudence. At most,138
it suggests instead an enforcement power argument resting on Congress’s
power to enact prophylactic legislation139 protecting post-natal life. Such an
argument flows from both the PBABA’s finding that a fetus aborted pursuant
to the prohibited method was “mere inches away from . . . becoming a person”
and its finding that the prohibited method “blurs the line between abortion

133
134

135
136

be inconsistent with our obligation under section 5 of the 14th Amendment to protect life.”). See
also David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and the Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59, 113 n.242 (1997) (recounting a congressperson’s statement
grounding the PBABA in the enforcement power).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–59 (1973).
See id. at 156–57 (“If this suggestion of [fetal] personhood is established, the appellant’s case, of
course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth]
Amendment.”).
The PBABA does not raise this issue, because it exempts from its prohibition situations where the
woman’s life depends on performance of the otherwise-prohibited procedure. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a).
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3. But see Keith Alexander, Federalism, Abortion, and the

Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power: Can Congress Ban Partial-Birth Abortions After
Carhart?, 13 TEX. REV. OF L. & POLITICS 105, 126–36 (2008) (acknowledging the PBABA’s state
action problem but suggesting that it could be overcome if Congress made it applicable only to states
that did not already ban partial-birth abortions). While that argument might answer Morrison’s
objection that VAWA applied nationwide, not just in states experiencing gender-biased law
enforcement, see supra note 79, it does not answer Morrison’s other objection that the Civil Rights
Cases and analogous precedent enforced a state action requirement even when the regulated private
conduct was encouraged or otherwise facilitated by government action. See 529 U.S. at 624–25.
137 Supra note 131.
138 See supra note 132 (explaining how the language could be understood as not implicating the
enforcement power at all).
139 Kimel, 528 U.S. at, 81 (allowing Congress to enact enforcement legislation “prohibiting a somewhat
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text”).
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and infanticide in the killing of a partially-born child just inches from birth.”140
On this reasoning, the enforcement power foundation for the law would rest
on the claim that Congress was merely applying (by prophylactically
protecting) the textually-recognized Fourteenth Amendment right to post-natal
life.141
Still, even mere prophylactic protection of post-natal life collides with the
judicially-recognized right to a late-term abortion if required for the woman’s
health. Of course, Congress found that women’s health never required such
abortions,142 and the Court deferred to those findings despite their
suspiciousness.143 On a reading of the PBABA as enforcement legislation,
those findings thus play two closely-related, indeed, mirror-image roles:
defeating a Casey-based abortion-rights attack and averting any collision
between the woman’s Fourteenth Amendment right and the post-natal rightto-life this argument assumes Congress was prophylactically enforcing.
Ultimately, the parties challenging the PBABA focused entirely on the
abortion rights issue, rather than the congressional power issue.144 Thus, it is
impossible to know how an enforcement power or commerce power challenge
would have fared.145 Indeed, a commerce power challenge to the PBABA
presents a fascinating counter-factual: Justices Thomas and Justice Scalia, two
of the bare majority of five justices voting to uphold the PBABA in Gonzales
v. Carhart, expressly reserved the commerce power question, observing that it
had been neither raised nor briefed by the parties.146 That uncertainty suggests
another variant on the application strategy—one focused not on the
enforcement power, but rather, the commerce power itself. Congress seems
to have embraced that variant when it almost literally applied the Commerce

140 Act, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(O) (2003).
141 To repeat, the prophylactic nature of this claim would not avoid the collision between that
prophylactic protection of post-natal life and the woman’s right to an abortion for reasons other than
protecting her life. See text accompanying supra notes 134–32. Nor would it solve the state action
problem. See supra note 136.
142 Act Pub. L. 108-105 § 2(2), (5), (13), (14) (2003).
143 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 166–67 (2007) (majority deference); id. at 174–80 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing Congress’s findings).
144 See generally Jordan Goldberg, The Commerce Clause and Federal Abortion Law: Why
Progressives Might be Tempted to Embrace Federalism , 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (2006)
(discussing that choice).
145 The PBABA prohibited any doctor from knowingly performing the prohibited procedure “in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a). Congress’s deliberations about the
Commerce Clause foundation for the law were, however, if anything more cursory than those
attending its consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment foundation. See, e.g., Alissa Schecter,
Choosing Balance: Congressional Powers and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2010 (2005) (noting the paucity of congressional deliberation on the issue).
146 550 U.S. at 168 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring).
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Clause by limiting the PBABA’s prohibition to those abortions performed “in
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”147
III.

ADAPTATION STRATEGIES

Part I introduced three strategies—challenge, avoidance, and application—
that Congress can employ when confronting either a hostile Court or hostile
precedent as it legislates to promote individual rights. Part II’s case studies
illustrate those strategies. This Part examines what those case studies reveal
about their benefits and drawbacks.

A. Challenges
The deliberations over the Civil Rights Act’s public accommodations
provisions reveal political actors contemplating a direct challenge to judicial
doctrine or the justices themselves. The CRA example illustrates how these
two targets are distinct: the debate on those provisions occurred against a
backdrop of hostile judicial precedent (the Civil Rights Cases’ state action
requirement) but also a Court that was suspected to be potentially amenable
to revisiting that precedent if prodded by an enforcement statute forcing the
question.148

147 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a). For a critique of this application attempt, see Kopel and Reynolds, supra note
132 at 111 (“Unless a physician is operating a mobile abortion clinic on the Metroliner, it is not really
possible to perform an abortion ‘in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.’”). Notwithstanding
this critique, it is generally accepted that Congress’s use of the “in or affecting” language reflects its
intention to exercise its commerce regulatory power its fullest reach. See, e.g., United States v. Yucel,
97 F. Supp. 3d 413, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“the phrase ‘in or affecting interstate commerce’ is a term
of art used by Congress to signal that it is exercising its pull power under the Commerce Clause.”).
Given that understanding, one can view Congress’s use of that term in the PBABA as reflecting a
desire both to assert its regulatory power to its constitutional limit and, if possible, to forestall a powers
attack on the law by definitionally limiting its applicability to conduct the Clause gives Congress the
power to regulate. Essentially, the latter claim would amount to an argument that the “in or affecting”
language constitutes the sort of jurisdictional element Lopez identified as tending to validate a claim
of congressional power. See 514 U.S. at 561-562. At least one scholar has questioned the correctness
of such an argument. See Allan Ides, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 203 and the Commerce
Clause, 20 CONST’L COMM. 441, 456-461 (2003-04). This Article’s limited consideration of this
issue does not require passing on this argument, other than to observe that Congress’s use of the “in
or affecting” language could be understood as a congressional attempt (successful or not) to tie the
PBABA’s reach explicitly to the reach of its commerce power, and thus as an attempt at literal
application of that power.
148 The Justices’ accommodating beliefs about congressional power to ground the public
accommodations provisions in the enforcement power were not well-known outside the Court, and,
according to one scholar, were only “partially revealed” in a 1964 case, Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226 (1964), decided well after the powers issue had been settled in Congress. Schmidt, infra. note
163 at 809. Nevertheless, scholars had perceived the evolution in the Court’s thinking on the state
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A congressional challenge to judicial doctrine seeks, by definition, to create
doctrinal change Congress favors. Indeed, as with the CRA, such a challenge
may present a unique opportunity to obtain such change. But it is risky. Most
obviously, challenges can fail. If, for example, Congress had staked the CRA’s
public accommodations provisions’ constitutionality solely on the
enforcement power, and if that gambit failed, those provisions would have
been struck down—a politically disastrous result inflicting a possibly-fatal defeat
for the civil rights movement and reaffirming and thus strengthening the state
action requirement Congress sought to change. On the other hand, the very
magnitude of those stakes might have forced the Court to find a way to uphold
those provisions—flinching in a game of constitutional chicken.
Of course, on such a high-stakes issue one might expect Congress to hedge
its bets—for example, by citing the Commerce Clause as a backstop to its
enforcement power argument. But, as anyone familiar with the game of
chicken understands, the more a player creates ways of avoiding the
impending collision, the less credible it is as a competitor. Indeed, when the
federal government took an accommodationist position regarding the CRA’s
enforcement power foundation, defending the public accommodations
provisions primarily on Commerce Clause grounds with the Enforcement
Clause functioning as merely a backstop, the majority shunted that latter
theory aside,149 even though one scholar has concluded that a majority—and
perhaps all—of the Court would have endorsed it if forced to decide.150 As if
reflecting his regret with the government’s choice, Justice Black—a particularly
strong proponent of Congress’s Section 5 authority to regulate private
conduct151—hinted strongly that he would have voted to uphold the law on the
enforcement power ground.152 But only Justice Douglas made a full-throated
argument in its favor.153
The enforcement power also raises troubling longer-term implications if
Congress wields it in pursuit of its own constitutional vision. As explained
earlier,154 during deliberations on the CRA, concerns arose that grounding the
public accommodations provisions in the Enforcement Clause might
transform the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment to fully cover private

149
150
151
152
153
154

action question since at least the late 1940s. See id. at 781-86 (noting this evolution and scholars’ and
advocates’ reactions to it).
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250.
See Schmidt, infra note 163 at 803–04.
See id. at 806.
See 379 U.S. at 278–79 (Black, J., concurring).
See id. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring).
See supra Part II.A.
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businesses and institutions those provisions sought to regulate. The fear,
expressed by Attorney General Kennedy,155 was that regulating those private
entities via Section 5 enforcement legislation would convert them more
generally into state actors for purposes of Section 1’s self-executing provisions.
Thus, for example, he suggested that inclusion of religious schools in such
legislation would render them, as state actors, barred from conducting Bible
readings.156
This concern reflects the intricate relationship between enforcement
legislation and the Court’s understanding of Section 1’s self-executing
provisions. Unlike Commerce Clause legislation, enforcement legislation may
influence judicial doctrine if it reflects an alternative understanding of
Fourteenth Amendment law. To be sure, commerce legislation may also
influence the shape of the Commerce Clause, for example, if the Court
upholds the law by announcing a more expansive understanding of the
commerce power. But Congress’s textually-granted supervisory authority over
the Fourteenth Amendment—its power to “enforce” that amendment—gives
Congress much more direct control over its contours.
That control raises difficult questions. Understanding Congress’s Section
5 enforcement power as authorizing Congress to enact into law its own
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment raises the question whether that
understanding should influence, or even determine, the content of the Court’s
Section 1 doctrine.157 A positive answer calls into question the Court’s
authoritative role in declaring constitutional law. But a negative answer
renders constitutional doctrine inconsistent and fragmentary, with rules or
principles enforcement legislation enacts in one context absent from contexts
seemingly demanding similar treatment.158 To take Attorney General
Kennedy’s example, a negative answer would mean that state-licensed religious
schools would constitute state actors only for purposes of the conduct
governed by enforcement legislation, unless the Court decided on its own—

155 Supra note 53.
156 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that public school Bible
readings violate the Establishment Clause).
157 One version of this problem is the risk that Congress could enact into enforcement legislation its
own, more limited, understanding of constitutional rights. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, Justice Brennan
attempted to solve that problem by arguing that such legislation could only expand rights, not limit
them, thereby creating a “one-way ratchet.” See 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. See also id. at 668 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (responding to this argument).
158 Cf. Freund Statement, infra note 163 (warning against “fragmentary” grants of constitutional rights).
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perhaps prodded by Congress’s lead—that they merited general state actor
status.159
To be sure, this problem need not arise, at least not in its fullest form.
Under today’s Boerne regime, Congress’s enforcement power is explicitly
limited to deterring or remedying violations of judicially-declared rights.
Under that regime, valid enforcement legislation by definition remains within
the channel cut by the Court’s own Fourteenth Amendment interpretations.
But a milder variant of the problem still surfaces. Congress’s authority to enact
prophylactic legislation extending beyond the Court-stated constitutional rule160
allows Congress to single out particular subject-areas (such as employment) or
groups (such as the disabled) for regulation extending beyond what the
Constitution requires. The possibility of such special treatment again raises
the issue of different constitutional treatment for groups or contexts that legal
reasoning would group as similar. While the character of that treatment as
legislative rather than judicial eases the tension that differential creates, the
strain created by the resulting Section 1-Section 5 gap persists.161
Grounding the CRA’s public accommodations provisions on Congress’s
commerce power obviated this problem. As that option’s proponents noted,
that power allows Congress near-complete flexibility in wielding it: subject to
minimal due process and equal protection constraints,162 Congress can regulate
some businesses but not others, or impose some types of regulations but not

159 The state actor example may not be the best one, since state action presents context-specific questions
yielding different results applicable to the same entity. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974) (“[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated
as that of the State itself.”) (emphasis added). But the problem extends beyond the state action
question. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 163 at 805 (“[T]he under-examined assumption of the
Brown Court [that Congress had the Section 5 authority to prohibit racially-segregated schools] was
that there could be an allowable gap between Section 5 and Section 1, which could have two possible
consequences for the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. Either the Court would be willing to
recognize and accept this gap . . . . Or (more likely) the Court would follow Congress in redefining
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause—that is, the congressional interpretation of equal
protection would then be adopted by the Court as a self-enforcing constitutional right.”).
160 See supra note 35
161 See supra note 159; see also Freund Statement, infra note 163 at 1189 (warning that Congress’s use
of its enforcement power to regulate private parties would render “the responsibility on Congress . . .
all the greater to think through the implications of its action for constitutional claims that are not
precisely those recognized in the bill but in principle may be comparable”).
162 See, e.g., Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129–33 (1942) (noting and disposing of due process
arguments); United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (noting and disposing of equal
protection arguments).
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others, without creating inconsistencies in constitutional doctrine or impairing
the Supreme Court’s integrity as the ultimate expositor of constitutional law.163
The larger point is that a political branch strategy of challenging
unfavorable Fourteenth Amendment precedent must always consider the
larger implications of a successful challenge. Those larger implications
include considerations flowing from the nature of what Congress accomplishes
when it uses its enforcement power to enact regulations that differ from the
Court’s constitutional understanding. Those considerations lurk even when,
as required after Boerne, Congress purports merely to remedy or deter
violations of that judicial doctrine.

B. Avoidance
Ultimately, legislators and Administration officials considering the CRA’s
public accommodations provisions decided to deemphasize the enforcement
power and instead rely primarily on the Commerce Clause. That decision
highlights another strategy—avoiding the problems that lurk in a challenge
strategy by relying on another source of power.
Avoidance is a natural strategy when advocates of civil rights legislation
confront a hostile Court and/or hostile precedent. It is feasible because, as
noted earlier,164 Congress enjoys broad latitude to enact Article I-based
legislation for reasons beyond those directly implicated by the particular grant
of power—for example, imposing a tax for non-revenue-raising reasons and
regulating commerce for reasons remote from any motivation to improve
commerce itself.165 This non-scrutiny of motivation allows Congress to use
these other powers to promote constitutional rights, thus avoiding any
problems arising from use of the enforcement power.
To be sure, avoidance raises its own concerns. As a practical matter, every
source of congressional power carries its own restrictions. Those restrictions
might well make that alternative power less desirable, by either reducing the
scope of Congress’s regulatory reach as compared with the Enforcement
Clause or otherwise limiting the legislation’s effectiveness. Most notably, the
163 See, e.g., A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate
Commerce: Hearing on S. 1732 Before the S. Commerce Comm., 88th Cong., 1183, 1187 (1963)
(brief of Professor Paul A. Freund) (“Freund Statement”) (The Commerce Clause “is primarily a
grant of legislative power to Congress, which can be exercised in large or small measure, flexibly,
pragmatically, tentatively, progressively, while guaranteed rights, if they are declared to be conferred
by the Constitution, are not to be granted or withheld in fragments.”), quoted in Christopher Schmidt,
The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 767, 813 (2010).
164 See text accompanying supra notes 19–20.
165 See supra notes 19–20.
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substantive and remedial reach of today’s commerce power, while still broad,
has been limited by cases decided over the last thirty years, especially in its
ability to regulate states—the very feature that makes that power an attractive
alternative to the enforcement power.166 While the Enforcement Clause is
subject to separate and distinct limitations,167 it is either undeniably or arguably
free from at least some of the ancillary restrictions the Court has imposed on
Commerce Clause-based regulation of states.168
Beyond these practicalities lies a more conceptual point about the
expressive value of grounding civil rights legislation in the constitutional
authority specifically concerned with civil rights—the enforcement power. As
this Article noted at the outset,169 concerns about grounding civil rights
legislation in the appropriate constitutional provision have surfaced since at
least Edwards v. California in 1941.170 They resurfaced again in the debates
over the CRA when legislators (and ultimately Justice Douglas) disposed to
grounding its public accommodations provisions on the Enforcement Clause
critiqued its Commerce Clause justification.171 It’s at least possible that the
same critique underlay Congress’s focus, in its ENDA deliberations, on the
enforcement power when the spending power appeared to provide an easier
argument.172
This conceptual concern potentially interacts with the more practical one
noted earlier. A Court predisposed to trimming Congress’s commerce power
might well find attractive targets in civil rights legislation, exactly because the
Enforcement Clause beckons as the more intuitively obvious home for such
laws. To be sure, some civil rights legislation—such as the CRA or ENDA’s
non-remedial provisions—falls within the heartland of valid Commerce Clause
regulation. However, other civil rights legislation could fall prey to the justices’
desire to further limit Congress’s Article I powers.

166 See supra note 28 (addressing limits on Article I-based regulation of states, including the provision
of remedies against states); supra note 31 (addressing the general scope of the commerce power).
167 See Flores, 521 U.S. at 507 (requiring that enforcement legislation be congruent and proportional to
the targeted constitutional violations); see also Holder, 570 U.S. at 529 (striking down a provision of
the Voting Rights Act as Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation because it reflected outdated
data and inappropriately imposed unequal burdens on the states).
168 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that, when legislating under its Enforcement
Clause power, Congress may subject unconsenting states to lawsuits seeking retrospective relief). See
also Edward Hartnett, Distinguishing Permissible Preemption from Unconstitutional
Commandeering, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 351, 375 (2020) (considering whether enforcement
legislation is subject to the anti-commandeering principle).
169 See supra. Part I.A..
170 See text accompanying supra notes 21–23.
171 See Part II.A.; Heart of Atlanta Hotel, 379 U.S. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring).
172 See supra note 93.
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Most notably, United States v. Morrison’s insistence on demarcating
regulatory fields beyond the commerce power’s reach might yield more
unhappy results for civil rights legislation not targeting economic activity.
Voting rights, educational equity, policing and criminal justice reform, and
hate crimes legislation all regulate activities the Court might consider noneconomic and thus presumptively beyond the Commerce Clause’s reach. The
Court might be especially likely to reject the Commerce Clause foundation for
such laws if it viewed the commerce justification as an attempt to avoid having
to defend them on enforcement power grounds. Indeed, the federal appellate
court whose strike-down of VAWA was affirmed in Morrison criticized the
litigants defending VAWA’s constitutionality on quite similar grounds.173
The argument that the availability of the enforcement power as a logical
home for a law might persuade the Court to reject its commerce power
grounding remains highly speculative. Nonetheless, the temptation Congress
might feel to invoke the Commerce Clause or some other congressional
power174 in order to avoid confronting the Court’s enforcement power
jurisprudence could conceivably backfire if such attempts are perceived not
just as congressional overreach, but overreach motivated by Congress’s
recognition of the enforcement power’s limits.

C. Application
Given these risks, a third alternative naturally presents itself. Rather than
directly confronting hostile justices or Enforcement Clause precedent, or
avoiding that precedent entirely, Congress may justify civil rights legislation as
applying that precedent. The idea is as modest as it is straightforward:
Congress takes Court-stated Fourteenth Amendment doctrine as a given—as
the “Amendment” Congress is authorized to enforce—and seeks merely to
apply that law by identifying circumstances where that law is violated and/or
remedies that, in its view, adequately punish and/or deter such violations.
Indeed, it is not only modest and straightforward; the Court’s post-Boerne
caselaw has firmly embraced this idea, at least ostensibly.175

173 See Brzonkola v. Va. Poly. Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Confronted by the Supreme
Court’s intervening decision in City of Boerne v. Flores during this appeal, the appellants [defending
the provision’s constitutionality] retreated to defend the statute primarily as an exercise, not of
Congress’ power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but of its power under the
Commerce Clause—notwithstanding the statute’s regulation of conduct neither commercial nor
interstate.”).
174 See, e.g., supra note 91 (citing one version of ENDA that sought to use Congress’s conditional
spending power to induce states to waive their sovereign immunity).
175 See supra note 35.
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Given the varying levels of generality at which one could cast Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine, much enforcement legislation could be plausibly
defended as applying it. Even Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act,
enfranchising citizens literate in Spanish and upheld in Morgan partially based
on Congress’s independent constitutional interpretive authority, could
alternatively be understood as simply applying Court-stated equal protection
law governing English literacy tests, even though it arguably contradicted a
previous Court decision upholding such tests.176
The application justification is buttressed by institutional competence
arguments extolling Congress’s superior capacity to find the various type of
facts that assist the proper application of Court-stated constitutional law.177
Given the inherent logic of an application approach, Boerne’s approval of it,
the amenability of much Fourteenth Amendment doctrine to significant
legislation plausibly defensible on that basis, and Congress’s fact-finding
superiority, one can understand the argument favoring significant
congressional authority to apply Fourteenth Amendment doctrine.
Yet this straightforward argument quickly becomes clouded. First, as a
matter of realpolitik, accurate congressional application of constitutional
doctrine is not guaranteed to succeed when that application threatens the
Court’s broader commitments. Thus, the VAWA Congress’s dutiful
inclusion of findings detailing the connection between gender-motivated
violence and interstate commerce did not save the statute in Morrison when
reliance on those findings to uphold the law threatened to undermine the
Court’s agenda of crafting limits on the commerce power.178 That same
federalism agenda also appeared to motivate the Morrison Court when it
arguably moved the enforcement power goalposts by imposing a version of

176 Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). This argument goes beyond the
alternative, more modest, Morgan theory avoiding Lassiter, in which Section 4(e) simply enforced
the right of New York’s Puerto Rican community to gain its fair share of government services by
giving it a political voice. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652–53 (setting forth this rationale). Rather, it
directly engages Lassiter, but understands Section 4(e)’s ostensible challenge to Lassiter as something
more modest—as reflecting Congress’s conclusion that, given the New York Puerto Rican
community’s access to Spanish language news outlets, Lassiter’s recognition of government’s interest
in an informed electorate, 360 U.S. at 51–52, did not justify disenfranchising persons Section 4(e)
enfranchised. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653–55. Compare id. at 654 (suggesting that Congress had
reason to suspect that racism motivated New York’s literacy requirement); with Lassiter, 360 U.S. at
53–54 (observing that Lassiter did not involve a race discrimination claim). For a fuller discussion of
this understanding of Morgan, see WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96–97,
104 (2016).
177 See Araiza, Deference, infra. note 201.
178 See supra. notes 85–86.
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the state action requirement not mandated by the relevant Reconstruction-era
precedents.179 In short: straightforward congressional application of Courtstated law may well fail if it threatens another value the Court cares about.
More conceptually, the application strategy is complicated by deep
uncertainty about the proper understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment
“law” Congress is authorized to enforce.180 This complication arose in two
post-Boerne decisions, Kimel v. Board of Regents181 and Board of Trustees v.
Garrett,182 striking down enforcement legislation. Those opinions were heavily
criticized, not just for their stringent application of Boerne’s congruence and
proportionality requirement, but also for their equation of the “law” (to which
the legislation had to be congruent and proportional) with the Court’s own
institutionally-bounded, sub-constitutional doctrinal rules.183 As Justice Breyer
noted in his Garrett dissent, those doctrinal rules reflect appropriate judicial
self-restraint, rather than core constitutional law, and thus, correctly
understood, did not limit congressional action.184
ENDA’s legislative history features a congressional attempt to apply these
sub-constitutional doctrinal rules. As noted earlier,185 that history featured
detailed analysis arguing that sexual orientation satisfies the criteria for suspect
class status, as part of the well-known tiered scrutiny structure which scholars
and judges persuasively argue is not itself constitutional “law.”186 By contrast,
the argument in ENDA’s legislative history about the irrationality of sexual
discrimination employment discrimination is at least susceptible to being
understood as a congressional attempt to apply core constitutional meaning—
that is, the core equal protection rule that, when it legislates, government must
act reasonably in pursuit of a public purpose.187
This distinction matters when evaluating the “application” strategy. A
congressional argument that enforcement legislation applies core
constitutional principles sends a very different message than an argument that
such legislation applies sub-constitutional judicial decision rules such as the
test for suspect class status. The former argument insists that subconstitutional doctrine reflects merely judicially-manageable decision rules

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

See supra notes 81–82.
For a longer discussion of this issue, see Araiza, supra note 176, chs. 4–6.
528 U.S. 62 (2000).
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
See supra note 124.
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 382–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See supra Part II.C.
See supra note 124.
See text accompanying supra notes 112–120 (recounting these arguments in more detail).
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that help courts decide constitutional cases, rather than constitutional law itself.
It thus asserts Congress’s authority to transcend such decision rules and apply
core constitutional principles.
By contrast, the latter argument acknowledges judicial doctrine as the
appropriate focal point for enforcement power analysis, even if that doctrine
merely reflects such decision rules. If Congress argues that its legislation
applies such decision rules, then it implicitly concedes the constitutional status
of those rules—i.e., it acknowledges that the Court sets the terms of Congress’s
application authority. Because those rules flow from the Court’s sense of its
own institutional limitations, Congress’s acceptance of those rules as the
proper focal point for enforcement legislation abnegates its unique
institutional authority and capacity when working with the Court on the project
of implementing constitutional meaning.188
Nevertheless, sometimes mere “applications” of Court-stated law can be
quite aggressive, and, indeed, can come close to challenging judicial doctrine.
Consider the PBABA. Beyond purporting to find no serious infringement on
the right the Court has recognized—the woman’s right to a late-term abortion
when her health demands it189—the Congress that enacted the PBABA also
sought to ground its abortion restriction on the right to life enjoyed by postnatal persons. Recall the House report finding both that “partially born”
fetuses were “mere inches away from becoming a person,”190 and that partialbirth abortions corroded respect for such post-natal life by “blur[ring] the line
between abortion and infanticide.”191
These findings could be read as implying congressional assertion of some
level of constitutional right to life for fetuses—an assertion that would challenge
Roe’s rejection of that idea and with it the foundation of a right to terminate
fetal life.192 To be sure, they could also be understood as supporting a less
aggressive decision by Congress to prophylactically safeguard the Fourteenth
Amendment right to post-natal life by extending that protection backward,
several “inches” before it begins.193 Indeed, the statute’s citation of the Court’s
foundational abortion rights opinions194 suggests the superiority of this latter
188 See Araiza, supra note 176, ch. 6.
189 See Partial Birth Abortion Act, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(B), (D), (F), (O) (finding that the
prohibited procedure was never necessary for women’s health). The statute did provide exceptions
for women’s lives. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a).
190 Supra note 131.
191 Supra note 140.
192 See supra note 134 (quoting Roe’s recognition of the implications for abortion rights of recognizing
the constitutional status of fetal life).
193 See text accompanying supra notes 139–140 (presenting this argument in more detail).
194 See Partial Birth Abortion Act, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(H).
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reading. But even construing the PBABA as this more modest, prophylactic
application of the judicially-recognized right to post-natal life nevertheless
steers the statute on a collision course with the (similarly judicially-recognized)
right to a late-term abortion for health reasons.
Of course, the PBABA’s authors addressed the women’s health issue—
probably not as part of the underdeveloped enforcement power argument just
sketched out, but rather, more straightforwardly, in response to Stenberg v.
Carhart’s insistence that all abortion regulations provide exceptions for
women’s health.195 The statute’s response to that insistence—that the PBABA
did not require a health exception because the prohibited procedure was never
necessary for women’s health—raises the final issue the application strategy
implicates: the deference due Congress when it purports to apply Court-stated
constitutional law.196 While the deference question arose in the PBABA in the
course of the Court’s examination of a statute attacked as rights-limiting,197 the
same question arises in the context of rights-promoting legislation.198 As with
the rights-limiting context of the challenge to the PBABA, the level of
deference courts accord legislative conclusions (including fact-findings) largely
determines the fate of rights-promoting legislation grounded on such
conclusions.
The Court’s approach to the deference question in the enforcement power
context turns on a variety of issues.199 Most importantly for current purposes,
its insistence that enforcement legislation hew closely to the Court’s own subconstitutional decision rules has rendered it skeptical of Congress’s findings
when that legislation targets either constitutional wrongs those rules identify as
less serious or the core constitutional commitment of rational government
action.200 More generally, the Court’s approach to the deference question is
deeply problematic. The analysis is intricate and far beyond the scope of this
Article, but suffice it to say that the Court’s approach to this question is marked

195 See supra notes 126-127.
196 In the PBABA example, that application could be understood as application of either the Court’s
abortion rights jurisprudence or the post-natal right-to-life enforcement argument the text sketches
out.
197 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165–67.
198 See generally Araiza, Deference, infra. note 201.
199 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Araiza, Deference, infra. note 201.
200 See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368–72 (applying skeptical review of Congress’s findings relating to the
underlying constitutionality of a form of discrimination that received only rational basis judicial
review). Compare Hibbs, supra note 123 (stating that “it was easier” for Congress to amass the
required factual showing when it legislated to combat sex discrimination rather than disability
discrimination, because sex discrimination is a judicially-recognized quasi-suspect classification).
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by inconsistency and poorly-theorized understandings of the proper roles of
Court and Congress in reaching such conclusions.201
Unless and until the Court creates and applies a more coherent approach
to the deference question, the application option will remain a complex one
with uncertain prospects in any given case. Its complexity and uncertainty are
exacerbated by the Court’s manipulation of its deference analysis to account
for the degree to which enforcement legislation attempts to apply, not the
Court’s own institutionally-limited doctrine implementing the Fourteenth
Amendment, but that Amendment’s core law.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
One basic lesson these historical examples teach for future civil rights
legislation is that no path is guaranteed to succeed. Challenging the Court or
its doctrine risks losing. Avoiding that doctrine runs the risk of encountering
completely different landmines threatening the legislation. Indeed, it risks
creating such landmines if the Court perceives the avoidance tactic as an
attempt to circumvent judicial doctrine blocking more obvious doctrinal
foundations, and responds by trimming the alternative power. Finally,
applying the Court’s doctrine traps Congress into playing the Court’s game,
unless the Court defers to Congress when it seeks to apply not just courtcreated doctrine but core constitutional rules—something it has not been
willing to do since Boerne.
One can say more about challenges. Generally, challenges to the Court
and its doctrine are less likely to succeed today, given the Court’s Boernefueled insistence on judicial supremacy, not just in stating constitutional
meaning, but in implementing that meaning via doctrinal rules such as suspect
class determinations. But such statements must be more granular to be
accurate. A Court, like today’s, that is already on a mission—say, to restrict
abortion rights or increase free religious exercise rights—will likely be
amenable to such “challenges” to its existing doctrine, just as the early 1960s
Warren Court was not just amenable but eager to follow Congress’s lead on
the state action issue as soon as Congress grasped the reins. When the Court
“defers” to Congress only when Congress is already moving in the Court’s
preferred direction, “challenges” succeed only when they challenge doctrine
201 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights,
84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 945 (1999) (“[T]he concept of deference remains malleable, indeterminate,
and not well-defined.”). See generally William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding
in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878 (2013); Araiza, supra.
note 176, ch. 7.
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the Court is already moving away from.202 After Boerne, that is truer than ever
before.
Avoidance also carries particular risks today. Today’s Court is not one
presumptively friendly to Congress’s exercise of its Article I powers. If
Congress seeks to use its commerce power to regulate in pursuit of civil rights,
it should expect careful judicial scrutiny unless the law remains within the
heartland of that power. After National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius,203 one might even expect that same skepticism when Congress uses
its spending power.204 Any cutbacks the Court might impose on those powers
would not, of course, remain confined to civil rights legislation.
That leaves application. Application seems a benign strategy. Yet it risks
conceding to the Court the authority to set the terms of Congress’s
enforcement power, if that strategy requires Congress to frame its application
by reference to the Court’s own constitutional decision rules. That termsetting concession cripples Congress’s authority to stake out stronger positions
on civil rights issues than could the Court, confined by own institutional
limitations.
Today, civil rights legislative initiatives stand at the forefront of the national
conversation in a way not seen since the 1960s. But unlike then, today the
Court is far more skeptical, not only of the obvious, Enforcement Clausebased, foundation for such laws, but of their alternative Article I foundations
as well.205 That skepticism demands that Congress think long and hard as it
decides where and how to ground civil rights legislation. Those decisions will
determine the fate of such legislation. The stakes are high.

202 Cf. supra. note 44 (noting the mid-Century Court’s tentative undermining of the state action rule).
203 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
204 See Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, & Kevin Outterson, Plunging Into Endless
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93
B.U. L. REV. 1, 4 n.14 (2013) (citing scholars recognizing the importance of the spending power issue
in National Federation).
205 Cf. Schmidt, supra. note 163 at 813 (citing President Kennedy’s Solicitor General’s confidence that
the CRA’s public accommodations provisions would be upheld as valid Commerce Clause
legislation).
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